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ABSTRACT 
Nonlethal strategies are an essential part in the military targeting process to defeat and 
disrupt terrorist and insurgent networks. The majority of nonlethal options of military 
power come through Information Operations, including the use of deception. This thesis 
explores how a deception plan against a terrorist network can be informed and prepared 
using social network analysis methods. Selecting targets that fragment the network 
becomes the object of the deception, whereas the actual targets of deception are 
individuals who are connected to these fragmentation nodes. A simulation of how 
information diffuses through the network helps identify how rapidly and how far a 
misinformation message might spread. Social network analysis also shows where 
intelligence collection might be incorporated to provide feedback about the success of 
message dissemination and the deception effort.  
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I. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM 
A. BACKGROUND 
Since 9/11, the U.S. military has been working hard at attacking terrorist networks 
in order to disrupt them or bring them down. Some strategies to attack the network have 
focused on lethal action, defined as combat operations that “close with and destroy or 
seize enemy facilities, equipment, or personnel... as a means to end [the enemy’s] will to 
resist.”1 Some examples of lethal strategies include drone strikes on suspected training 
camps or against suspected high value individuals such as Anwar al-Awlaki, and the 
Special Operations Forces mission that killed Osama bin Laden. Other successful lethal 
targeting missions include the deaths of top al-Qa’ida in Iraq leaders, heavily disrupting 
this organization’s efforts in Iraq.2 
The pursuit of lethal strategies has had its downsides, such as increasing, rather 
than reducing, the number of insurgents. It is counterintuitive to think that removing 
leaders and organizers of insurgencies may actually increase the resolve of the people in 
whom the insurgency resides. For instance, Major General Michael Flynn points out that 
the brutal tactics of the Soviet counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan only served to 
broaden the size of the insurgency.3 Admiral Eric Olson, former commander of U.S. 
Special Operations Command said that a direct action mission is “urgent and necessary, 
but not decisive. It is a holding action that buys time for the indirect approach to have its 
decisive effect.”4   
                                                 
1 Charles Faint and Michael Harris, “F3EAD: Ops/Intel Fusion ‘Feeds’ the SOF Targeting Process,” 
Small Wars Journal (January 31, 2012). Accessed November 13, 2012. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/f3ead-opsintel-fusion-”feeds”-the-sof-targeting-process.  
2 JD, “Lethal Targeting in Iraq; Success on an Unprecedented Scale,” al Sahwa (April 22, 2010). 
Accessed November 13, 2012. http://al-sahwa.blogspot.com/2010/04/lethal-targeting-in-iraq-success-
on.html.  
3 Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, Paul T. Batchelor, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Intelligence 
Relevant in Afghanistan,” Voices from the Field (Center for a New American Security, January 2010), 8. 
4 Eric T. Olson, “Q&A: Admiral Eric T. Olson,” Special Operations Technology 6 no. 4 (2008). 
Accessed November 13, 2012. http://www.special-operations-technology.com/sotech-home/56-sotech-
2008-volume-6-issue-4/423-qaa-admiral-eric-t-olson.pdf.  
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One of the key challenges in current counterterrorism efforts is to find nonlethal 
strategies that may avoid the downsides of lethal targeting and offer a greater advantage 
in terms of the risks undertaken or the resources employed to execute the strategies. The 
search is on for strategies that maximize adversarial disruption while minimizing costs to 
those pursuing them. 
Nonlethal strategies are defined here as “those instruments aimed at modifying or 
disrupting an adversary’s ability to operate effectively while also changing his behavior 
using nonlethal means. Nonlethal fires change perceptions while shaping conditions that 
are favorable to our own goals and objectives.”5 Nonlethal strategies include stability and 
civil support operations such as reconstruction and cleanup in humanitarian and disaster 
relief, rebuilding infrastructure damage after combat operations, medical and veterinarian 
services, and “other nonlethal, constructive actions by Soldiers working among 
noncombatants.”6 Alternately, “nonlethal, constructive actions can persuade the local 
populace to withhold support from the enemy and provide information to friendly 
forces.”7 Many of these actions are coordinated through Civil Affairs programs. 
In addition to the stability and civil support operations conducted through Civil 
Affairs, many of the nonlethal strategies fall under the umbrella of Information 
Operations (IO). Many commanders have come to realize that IO is not just a 
conglomeration of information related tasks and capabilities, but a decisive and critical 
component to military campaigns. COL Ralph Baker, a former brigade commander in 
Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom said, “I quickly discovered that IO was going to 
be one of the two most vital tools (along with human intelligence) I would need to be 
successful in a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.”8 
                                                 
5 Dewey A. Granger, “Integration of Lethal and Nonlethal Fires: The Future of the Joint Fires Cell,” 
monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (2009), 19. 
6 United States Army, Field Manual 3.0: Operations, Washington, DC: Department of Defense (Feb. 
2011), 3–26. 
7 FM 3.0: Operations, 3–27. 
8 Ralph O. Baker, “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective on 
Information Operations,” Military Review (May-June 2006), 13. 
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IO support and complement a full range of nonlethal strategies through the 
military targeting process—the forum in which a friendly commander’s objectives are 
operationalized against the adversary. The goal in the process is to spot points of 
vulnerability within the network that are susceptible to influence activities (i.e., 
psychological warfare and deception), points for informational diffusion (related to both 
Military Information Support and Public Affairs activities), and both formal and informal 
influence nodes whom key U.S. leaders can approach to shape opinions and actions.9  
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate how to craft nonlethal IO strategies to 
disrupt networks. In particular, this thesis develops recommendations, informed by IO 
techniques, to take to the targeting and planning processes. Ultimately, the intention is to 
prompt the network to implode from within or to modify normal operating procedures by 
sowing seeds of mistrust through a deception plan rather than require lethal interventions 
from the outside. The goal of such a plan would be to expel, remove, or otherwise limit 
the relationships and impacts of key nodes.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis addresses the question: How can the IO planner make more 
appropriate recommendations for nonlethal targeting? Answers to this question will 
reveal methods for creating a list of nodes whose removal will highly fragment the 
network as well as reveal methods for quickly diffusing a message through the network.  
D. THESIS SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The framework of this thesis is a simulation study of how the IO method of 
deception produces disruption effects through fragmentation. The first step is to collect 
data on which to test a deception strategy. Data for this exercise is drawn from a network 
of terrorists in Indonesia associated with Noordin Top, who was formerly a member of 
                                                 
9 Army FM 3–0 uses “inform and influence activities” to provide scope and guidance on the 
informational domain of warfighting. Military Information Support Operations (MISO), public affairs, 
military deception, and soldier/leader engagements are examples of the activities required to dominate the 
information domain. FM 3.0: Operations, 6–16. 
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Jemaah Islamiyah. These terrorists were directly involved with the 2003 Marriott Hotel 
bombing and the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta, Indonesia, as well as the 
2005 Bali bombings, among others. 
The second step is to analyze the network. Social network analysis (SNA) has 
been utilized to analyze terror networks, regardless of the strategy being pursued and will 
be employed in this research as well. The use of SNA methodologies such as 
transforming link diagrams to one-mode networks, running centrality measures to 
describe network positions, and deducing sub-groups provide insight into how a network 
is potentially vulnerable to lethal targeting operations.10 While SNA methods have been 
applied to understand social influence and messaging, they have not been operationalized 
for IO practitioners. The IO planner should use all available techniques (including SNA) 
to develop the best IO strategies against the network.  
The identification of starting nodes for a target list comes from Borgatti’s Key 
Player 1 analysis tool.11 This software uses social network algorithms to generate lists of 
individuals who, if removed or expelled, would optimally fragment the network. Key 
Player 1 also generates lists of people who, if given a piece of information, will rapidly 
diffuse that information across the network. These are separate algorithms that generate 
separate lists, but I will demonstrate how a deception plan can make use of both. 
The third step is to simulate how far across the network misinformation can travel 
given a certain set of starting points. For this exercise, I use ORA’s Micro Simulation 
tool. This simulation takes the starting nodes identified as points for optimal diffusion by 
the Key Player tool and graphically shows, over time, what part of the network has 
received the message and what part has not.  
Visualizing the reach of misinformation is important as it shows which nodes 
have yet to receive the new information during a particular time period. If the analyst 
realizes that nodes directly connected to our target node will not receive the 
                                                 
10 Kathleen M. Carley, Ju-Sung Lee, and David Krackhardt, “Destabilizing Networks,” Connections 
24, no. 3 (2002): 7992. 
11 Stephen P. Borgatti, “Identifying Sets of Key Players in a Social Network,” Computational, 
Mathematical and Organizational Theory 12 (2006): 21–34. 
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misinformation in a timely manner, then we should adjust the number and selection of 
starting nodes to ensure we reach the “right” individuals. In this case, the “right” 
individuals are those directly connected to our node, who, if they believe the 
misinformation, will attempt to isolate or expel the untrusted target. Alternately, 
organizational leadership may use their influence to remove the targeted individual from 
his position in the network, causing the fragmentation effect we desire, but they must also 
have the opportunity to receive the misinformation before they can act. 
Finally, analysts can use the information diffusion simulation to assist in creating 
an intelligence collection plan. There will be locations within the network that would 
make good places to use human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), 
and other intelligence resources to create a feedback mechanism that monitors the 
information environment for indicators that our misinformation is spreading correctly and 
that our deception plan is having an effect. This feedback must be in place before 
implementing the plan or we risk losing some of these indicators. 
Although some factors of planning a thorough deception scheme are referenced 
herein, this thesis will only focus on the mechanism for choosing initial targets, the 
theoretical information diffusion that will occur by inserting messages at selected entry 
points, and possible locations for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
needed to observe and collect on the effectiveness of fragmentation and information 
diffusion. This mechanism applies to IO strategies as a whole, not only to deception. The 
manner in which our misinformation is inserted into the network is not within the scope 
of this thesis, but may include information enablers such as Military Information Support 
Operations (MISO), Public Affairs, leader engagement, military cyber capabilities and so 
forth, to covertly and overtly insert and reinforce communications, messages, 
misinformation and truthful information. 
E. CHAPTER REVIEW 
I introduce the problem and research question in Chapter I. Chapter II is a review 
of literature relevant to nonlethal strategies. It begins with an overview of Information 
Operations doctrine and methods, as IO strategies tend to focus on nonlethal methods. 
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Next, it reviews influence theory, social movement theory, as well as network 
destabilization techniques. Chapter III describes the data set and the research design that 
culminates in a simulation to explore the theoretical reach of misinformation across our 
network. Social network analysis methods applicable to this research are also discussed. 
Chapter IV summarizes the results of the simulation that measure the level of disruption 
in a network using fragmentation, the extent of information diffusion, as well as potential 
places in the network for further intelligence collection. Chapter V discusses this analysis 
and how it applies to the creation of a deception scheme. Limitations of the research 
design and methods are also discussed. Chapter VI contains recommendations for IO 
planners and military commands on the pursuit of deception strategies. Follow-on 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of IO in military operations begins in doctrine, yet understanding 
the viability of IO input into the creation of nonlethal strategies for network disruption 
must begin with an understanding of the broad categories of influence theory, social 
movement theory, and a growing corpus of network destabilization techniques. In order to 
influence a target group, whether an individual or a massive foreign audience, we must 
understand what motivates people to make decisions and join organizations, how social 
factors heavily impact human reactions to messages and ideas, and how to engineer these 
social factors to work in the favor of U.S. forces. Only by understanding the forces that 
work to bind people together can deception strategy begin to formulate plans on how to 
unbind them. Although this thesis uses a deception plan as the vehicle for a nonlethal IO 
strategy, other elements of IO are served by the literature review that follows. 
B. IO DOCTRINE AND METHODS 
There is much confusion and misunderstanding about information operations, 
both in doctrine and in practice. Constantly changing doctrine, terms, staff functions, and 
a variety of best practices have not made it easy for the IO practitioner to establish 
legitimacy in the targeting process.12 The most recent and definitive definition of IO 








                                                 
12 Joseph L Cox, “Information Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom – What 
Went Wrong?” monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff 
College (2006). 
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defines IO as “the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-
related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, 
or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting 
our own.”13 
Joseph Cox, a student at the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies 
wrote, “Perhaps it would be better if commanders thought of IO as a combination of four 
functions: influence, inform, attack and protect, whose coordinated use produces an effect 
on the battlefield greater than merely adding the results of the individual functions 
together.”14 Since influencing the enemy commander is the primary objective of 
deception,15 this thesis narrows the review of IO methods down to the essentials of 
influence with little consideration to the inform, attack, and protect aspects. 
Although not an exhaustive list, the commander generally has three primary 
influence arms available for his IO influence strategy, not including the use of military 
force as a deterrent or coercive measure. The first method is key leader engagements 
(KLE), the second is Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and the third is 
military deception operations (MILDEC). A related capability is Public Affairs 
operations, which provide information to audiences but do not primarily seek to influence 
behaviors.  
1. Leader Engagement 
In some circumstances, the commander may conduct leader engagements 
personally with so-called “influential” members of the target audience. In others, he may 
direct meetings with subordinate leaders or request assistance from higher echelons when 
the appropriate community or network leader falls outside his sphere of influence. These 
                                                 
13 In 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates approved a definition of IO as “the integrated 
employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of 
operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential 
adversaries while protecting our own.” Robert Gates, “Strategic Communication and Information 
Operations in the DoD,” memorandum (January 25, 2011). 
14 Cox, “Information Operations,” 3. 
15 For instance, Latimer argues that “in battle it is not sufficient for a commander to avoid error; he 
needs actively to cause his enemy to make mistakes.” Jon Latimer, Deception in War (Woodstock, NY: 
Overlook Press, 2001), 1. 
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leader engagements are normally designed to influence behaviors by building trust and 
confidence in the other party.16 It may be the case that an individual occupies a 
leadership position, but the real influence may lie in a subordinate who controls monetary 
contracts or someone outside the leadership circle who knows the “scoop” on everyone. 
Who the “influential” members are is a matter of debate and properly identifying them is 
the aim of the research techniques presented in Chapter III. 
2. Military Information Support Operations (MISO) 
Military Information Support Operations (MISO), otherwise known as 
psychological operations, or PSYOP, provides the commander a vector into the 
psychological needs and susceptibilities of a target audience. The purpose of PSYOP is 
“to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to U.S. national 
objectives. PSYOP are characteristically delivered as information for effect, used during 
peacetime and conflict, to inform and influence.”17 IO strategies using MISO often are 
wide reaching, but may look at influencing individual behaviors in addition to masses of 
people.  
MISO are “employed to counter adversary propaganda and to sow disaffection 
and dissidence among adversaries to reduce their will to fight and ultimately to induce 
their surrender.”18 Since the mission of MISO is to “influence the behavior of foreign 
target audiences to support U.S. national objectives,” it is possible to use the skills and 
assets of MISO operatives to change behavior at the individual and organization level.19 
One behavior change is defection from the organization, mentioned above. Others may 
include reconciliation, surrender, or movement to areas less conducive to the network’s 
growth and sustainment. 
                                                 
16 Jimmy A. Gomez, “The Assessments Process in Contemporary Operating Environment,” Small 
Wars Journal, June 22, 2011. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-assessments-process-in-
contemporary-operating-environment.  
17 United States Army, Field Manual 3–05.30: Psychological Operations, Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense (Apr 2005): 1–1. 
18 Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” Journal of Social 
Structure 12, no. 2 (2011): 6. 
19 FM 3–05:30: Psychological Operations, 1–2. 
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Understanding message diffusion is important to the MISO plan. Everton asserts 
that a powerful use of information diffusion is to convince members of a network to 
defect. Studies have shown that a defection is much more disruptive to an insurgency 
than the death of a member.20 This is because of the leaders of the insurgency are 
uncertain what the defector has told the authorities, so generally, the organization must 
change procedures, reevaluate operational plans, and lie low.21  
3. Military Deception Operations 
Deception operations often are aimed at the cognitive processes of an adversarial 
force by influencing the opposing commander to make decisions based on what he thinks 
he sees or knows rather than what is actually going on. The Army defines military 
deception as “those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as 
to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary 
to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the 
friendly mission.”22  
One way to execute a deception is to send messages crafted in a way to cast doubt 
on the integrity or trustworthiness of a particularly important individual. Several 
principles of good deception make this possible. First, the deception must reach those 
actors who have the authority and ability to cause the target to be rejected from the 
network.23 These decision makers are likely to be within the core of the network and may 
be isolated from receiving messaging efforts directly from military-controlled assets. 
Second, the timing and delivery of any misinformation efforts must ensure a consistent 
and credible narrative.24 Third, the effectiveness of the deception hinges on causing the 
decision maker to believe what he already expects.25 Finally, creativity and imagination 
                                                 
20 Sean Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 36–37. 
21 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 37. 
22 FM 3.0: Operations, 6–108. 
23 Latimer, Deception, 60. 
24 Latimer, Deception, 67–69. 
25 Charles A. Fowler and Robert F. Nesbit, “Tactical Deception in Air-Land Warfare,” Journal of 
Electronic Defense (June 1995): 42–42. 
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are necessary to navigate through the factors of social influence that are the primary 
resistors to an effective deception operation.26 Only when these factors of deception are 
planned for should the IO strategist attempt to execute the program with any reasonable 
expectation that the intended outcome will come to pass.  
Another important factor to consider is whether the recipients of our information 
can actually piece together the same picture we had intended to send. Type-M deceptions 
(“misleading”) attempt to reduce ambiguity and point to a very clear, attractive picture in 
the wrong direction.27 If the misleading information is about the trustworthiness of a 
network member, then all hints and injected messages must help the decision makers 
come to the conclusion that our target must not be trusted. The opposite type of 
deception, Type-A, or ambiguity increasing, actually obscures the truth and makes it more 
difficult for a decision maker to make any conclusions about our intentions. This is 
counter-productive to network fragmentation effects in this context. 
C. INFLUENCE THEORY 
The first broad category of influence concerns influence and social networks, and 
begins with an understanding of social psychology. The broad field of social psychology 
attempts to study individual-to-individual interaction, individual-to-group interaction, and 
group-to-group interaction. Major divisions within this field include social influence, 
group dynamics, and interpersonal relations. Important topics within social influence are 
conformity, compliance, and obedience.28 These topics set the foundation for engineering 
influence operations. 
1. Social Influence 
Two motives drive social influence: normative and information influence. 
Normative influence describes how people conform in order to be socially accepted. Peer 
                                                 
26 Fowler and Nesbit, “Tactical Deception,” 76. 
27 Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig, Strategic Military Deception (New York: Pergamon, 1982): 6. 
28 “Social Psychology,” Wikipedia. Accessed September 5, 2012. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Social_psychology. 
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pressure is a form of normative influence.29 Reciprocation is another. Cialdini describes 
the powerful effect of reciprocation, or that feeling that one should try and repay what 
another has done for him.30 Even when a person would not normally be inclined to act, 
reciprocity creates an obligation for repayment of what was provided. A free sample of a 
product or a flower handed out by a solicitor is another method of creating this feeling of 
reciprocation. Information influence describes how people will seek information to create 
a correct or acceptable response. Cialdini says this method of conformity lies in the 
principle of social proof. When one is uncertain about how to act in a scenario, the 
normal response is to see how others act. For instance, in 1964, thirty-eight neighbors 
allegedly witnessed a murder in Queens and not one of them called the police, obviously 
anticipating someone else would do it.31 In emergency situations where someone takes a 
leadership role and directs perfect strangers to do tasks, such as phone the police or divert 
traffic, response is immediate.32 This is the result of social proof. Research within social 
influence includes famous studies like Milgrim’s electric shock experiment33 and Asch’s 
line estimation experiment.34  
2. Rules of Social Influence 
Included in influence theory are factors of our social network that guide our 
actions, attitudes, and beliefs. Christakis and Fowler describe five rules that illustrate the 
power of the interconnection of people and relationships.35 
                                                 
29 Cialdini and his associates have found that information programs that emphasize injunctive 
normative influences (what one ought to do) are much more influential than those that focus on descriptive 
norms (what normally is done) or when no focus is made on norms at all. See Robert B. Cialdini and Linda 
J. Demaine, et al., “Managing social norms for persuasive impact,” Social Influence 1 no. 1 (2006): 4–5. 
30 Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, New York: Harper Collins (2007), 17. 
31 Cialdini, Influence, 129–130. 
32 Cialdini, Influence, 139–140. 
33 Stanley Milgram, “Behavioral Study of Obedience,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67 
(October 1963): 371–378.  
34 Solomon E. Asch, “Opinions and Social Pressure,” Scientific American 193, vol 5 (November 
1955): 31–35. Asch’s experiments have been found to confirm the strength of normative influence and also 
show that uncertainty can be created when social proof and actual observations differ. See John C. Turner, 
Social Influence, Bristol, PA: Open University Press, 1991. 
35 Nicholas A. Christakis and James H. Fowler, Connected (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 
2009): 17–26. 
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Rule 1: We shape our network. We each decide the structure of our network by 
choosing how many people we are connected to and the strength of those connections. 
Our natural tendency is to associate with people who are like us. This is called 
homophily, or literally “love of being alike.”36 We join clubs based on our interests and 
belong to churches where others believe as we do. The inclusion or exclusion of people 
from our networks is often by choice, but sometimes circumstances such as geography, 
family make-up, and societal factors determine to whom we are connected. 
Rule 2: Our network shapes us. The number of friends and connections within our 
network has a significant influence on how we see the world. Christakis and Fowler 
argue that “having an extra friend may create all kinds of benefits for your health, even if 
this other person doesn’t actually do anything in particular for you.”37 Being in a tight-
knit military unit where each person has close connections to everyone else is different 
than being in a job where the only interaction is reporting results to a supervisor. The 
networks we belong to provide us meaning and constrain our behavior more than we 
realize.38 
Rule 3: Our friends affect us. The shape of our networks is not the only thing that 
matters. Information and resources that flow across connections matter as well. In 
addition to advice and the comfort of friendship, the influence of friends can alter our 
behavior and attitudes. Christakis and Fowler argue that we often mimic and influence 
those around us. For instance, they found that students performed better with roommates 
who were studious or that homeowners kept up their own lawns when they had a 
neighbor who was an avid gardener.39 
Rule 4: Our friends’ friends’ friends affect us. Christakis and Fowler also studied 
the effect of overweight friends on each other. Their conclusion? An obese person “was 
more likely to have friends, friends of friends, and friends of friends of friends who were 
                                                 
36 Christakis and Fowler, Connected, 17. 
37 Christakis and Fowler, Connected, 20. 
38 Sean Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 5. 
39 Christakis and Fowler, Connected, 22. 
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obese than would be expected due to chance alone.”40 Beyond this, though, there was no 
evidence of influence. This is the “Three Degrees of Separation” rule, which posits that 
we both influence and are influenced by those three steps away from us. The amount of 
influence may wane the further someone is from us, but there is still some measurable 
effect until that third step.41 
Rule 5: The network has a life of its own. The simplest method of ascertaining a 
person’s connections is to ask him; however, there are attributes and functions of a 
network “that are neither controlled nor even perceived by the people within them. These 
properties can be understood only by studying the whole group and structure, not by 
studying isolated individuals.”42 Traffic jams, stampedes, and the wave at sporting events 
are examples of networks that cannot be studied by querying the individual.43 Although 
closely linked to the same principles, the life a network has on its own is not quite the 
same as the field of group dynamics. 
3. Group Dynamics 
Group dynamics researchers study the roles, relationships, norms, and interaction 
of individuals within a group. To a large extent, the social identity of humans depends 
upon group membership. Those within a group share a social identity, which influences 
behavior and perception towards members of the same group and towards other groups.44 
Those in the same group are viewed favorably and those external to the group receive 
some measure of negative perception or perhaps discrimination. The sum total of group 
membership and the behaviors and perceptions that each group imparts on the individual 
ultimately define the identity of the individual himself.45 Other categories within group 
                                                 
40 Christakis and Fowler, Connected, 108. 
41 Christakis and Fowler, Connected, 27–28. The premise of three-degrees of influence has been 
challenged on mathematical and statistical grounds. See Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 247.  
42 Christakis and Fowler, Connected, 24–25. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, (1986). “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior,” in S. 
Worchel and W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations (Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall, 1986): 
7–24. 
45 Tajfel and Turner, “Social Identity Theory,” 7–24. 
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dynamics include group decision-making, which includes polarization and groupthink, 
social identity, and task efficiency or productivity.46  
4. Interpersonal Relations 
Interpersonal relations are closely related to social exchange theory. This theory 
posits that all human interactions and relationships use a subjective cost-benefit analysis 
to find a point of stability. This stability is when the interests of both parties are 
considered. Michael Roloff said, “The guiding force of interpersonal relationships is the 
advancement of both parties’ self-interest.”47 The particular worth of a relationship is 
calculated by the rewards minus the costs.48 This is salient for influence operations as 
increasing the costs of maintaining the relationship or breaking a relationship is one 
objective of coercive influence that might be used in a deception operation or via a series 
of leader engagements. Additionally, leader engagement strategies depend entirely upon 
the quality of relationship that can be established with a target audience. The trust created 
in a relationship between a senior U.S. leader and a tribal sheikh, for instance, can 
influence the reaction an entire tribal area has towards U.S. forces. 
5. Influence Operations 
Last, influence theory continues with definitions of influence operations, in 
particular, how military organizations can use influence to achieve objectives within the 
social domain. Influence operations are those that aim to “induce desired changes in the 
attitudes and behaviours of enemies.”49 U.S. Joint doctrine defines influence as 
operations that “cause others to behave in a manner favorable to U.S. forces.”50 The U.S. 
Army defines influence as a line of effort that “effectively changes attitudes, beliefs, and 
                                                 
46 “Social Psychology,” Wikipedia. Accessed September 5, 2012. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Social_psychology. 
47 Michael Roloff, Interpersonal Communication: The Social Exchange Approach (Beverly Hills: 
Sage Publications, 1981). 
48  P.R., Monge; N., Contractor (2003). Theories of Communication Networks. Oxford University 
Press, as quoted in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_exchange_theory.  
49 Barbara D. Adams, Jessica Sartori, and Sonya Waldherr, “Military Influence Operations: Review of 
Relevant Scientific Literature,” Toronto: Human Systems, Inc. (November 2007), 8. 
50 JP 3–13, “Information Operations,” (13 February 2006), p. I-10. 
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ultimately behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy populations to 
support operations. Influence guides actors to make decisions that support the 
commander’s objectives.”51  
There are two major methods of influence. The first is compliance and the second 
is persuasion. Compliance attempts to simplify change behavior in a manner favorable 
for the practitioner. It does not attempt to have the target internalize the reasons for the 
change in behavior. Sometimes, this behavior change is coerced through military might 
or force of law. Consider the sight of a patrolman with a radar gun on the side of a 
freeway. Invariably, the average speed of commuters goes down and drivers begin 
complying with posted speed limits. Persuasion, on the other hand, attempts to change 
the attitudes and beliefs of an individual. Persuasion targets the internal motivations for 
behavior change and usually sees a longer-lasting effect because of the internal advocacy 
towards the behavior change.52 Traffic accident footage on the nightly news and safe-
driver training programs may help a driver internalize the potentially dangerous effects of 
non-compliance with posted speed limits. 
D. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
Related to influence and social networks is social movement theory. It provides 
insight into what types of ideas and norms actually constitute influence. This theory relies 
heavily on framing, which is a psychological device that offers a perspective and allows 
the person to adopt certain features but ignore others in order to influence subsequent 
judgment.53 Positive frames and negative frames are opposite sides of the same coin. 
Using a positive frame to aid decision-making tends to reinforce less-risky choices, while 
examining the same decision with a negative frame tends to reinforce choices with more 
risk.54 Research indicates that the human tendency to avoid loss is an even more powerful 
                                                 
51 FM 3–0, C1, “Operations,” (22 February 2011), p. 6–17. 
52 Kelton Rhoads, “Working Psychology,” (2004), Accessed 5 September 2012, 
http://www.workingpsychology.com/definit.html. 
53 Rhoads, “Working Psychology,” http://www.workingpsychology.com/whatfram.html. 
54 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” 
Science 211 no. 4481 (1981): 453–458. 
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motivator for affecting choices. Negative frames tend to emphasize the prospect of a loss 
more than positive frames do. “Prospect theory… give[s] us an invaluable insight into 
human nature. We know that a human’s first priority is not to lose--gains are secondary to 
the “no loss” rule. Thus, framing a decision in terms of possible loss should motivate a 
person more than framing the same decision in terms of possible gain.”55 
Kelton Rhoads, a Senior Mentor at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, 
explains the balance of positive and negative information. “Psychologists have long 
known of the existence of the “positivity bias,” which states that humans overwhelmingly 
expect good things (as opposed to neutral or bad things) to occur. If perceivers construct 
a world in which primarily positive elements are expected, then negative information 
becomes perceptually salient as a jolting disconfirmation of those expectations. We also 
know that people stop to examine disconfirmations to a much higher degree than 
confirmations. Negative information is often highly informative and thus may be 
assigned extra weight in the decision-making.”56 
1. Motivations of a Social Movement 
Social movement theory argues that the motivations behind a movement are to 
forward the ideas and beliefs of some group, whether the ideas or beliefs are religious, 
environmentally based, or grounded on some other grievance or social cause. Meaning is 
created in the movement itself. “Movements function as carriers and transmitters of 
mobilizing beliefs and ideas, to be sure; but they are also actively engaged in the 
production of meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers.”57 If the meaning of a 
movement frames the beliefs and actions of a participant then in order to change the 
frame of a participant, one must change the meaning associated with the movement. 
There must be found a greater mobilizing belief or idea outside of the organization’s 
frame for a participant to change his involvement in that organization.  
                                                 
55 Rhoads, “Working Psychology,” http://www.workingpsychology.com/riskybeh.html. 
56 Rhoads, “Working Psychology,” http://www.workingpsychology.com/lossaver.html. 
57 David Snow and Robert Benford, “Ideology, Frame Reference, and Participant Mobilization,” 
International Social Movement Research 1 (1988): 198. 
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If the beliefs and aims of the movement are motivation enough to join, participate, 
and enlarge the movement, then the IO practitioner must find a way to connect that 
person with a different movement or idea in order to change his involvement in the first 
movement. For instance, strategic framing can heavily affect how recruits are drawn into 
an organization, how these groups stay together, and what causes them to break apart.58 
Frame analysis is a method of understanding how people understand the world around 
them. Modifying frames through alignment processes is a contributing factor to changes 
in behavior. This is possible when new frames resonate stronger than current frames.59 
Using frame alignment processes, any IO strategy can attempt to influence individuals 
and clusters of individuals within a network. Put differently, influence can be enhanced 
by understanding structural traits of networks while frame analysis can help us 
understand how to put together influential narratives to plant in target networks.  
2. Frame Alignment Processes 
Snow and Benford argue that there are four frame possible frame alignment 
processes, each of which are applicable to IO strategies. Frame bridging connects 
“ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames” regarding a specific 
problem set.60 Frame bridging seeks out unmobilized pools of individuals who have 
similar sentiments opinions. These data are often found from public opinion polls or 
rosters of group membership.61  
                                                 
58 David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden and Robert D. Benford, “Frame 
Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” American Sociological Review 51, 
no. 4 (Aug., 1986): 464. 
59 Snow and Benford argue that three framing tasks that motivate people for behavior change 
(mobilization, in the case of social movements). These tasks are: “a) diagnostic framing for the 
identification of a problem and assignment of blame, b) prognostic framing to suggest solutions, strategies, 
and tactics to a problem, and c) motivational framing that serves as a call to arms or rationale for action.” 
See David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” 
International Social Movement Research 1 (1988): 197–217 as quoted in 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frame_analysis.   
60 Snow, Rochford, Worden, Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes,” 467. 
61 Snow, Rochford, Worden, Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes,” 467–468. 
 19
Frame amplification clarifies and invigorates “an interpretive frame that bears on 
a particular issue, problem, or set of events.”62 Amplification of particularly poignant 
values and beliefs in the target audience is a strong mobilizing tactic, especially when 
amplification convinces a moral obligation to act.63  
Frame extension expands the boundaries of a “movement’s primary framework so 
as to encompass interests in points of view that are incidental to its primary objectives but 
of considerable salience to potential adherents.”64 Sometimes the values of the movement 
are not readily inherent in the target population so it is the obligation of the movement to 
expand its framework to include points of view with which the target more readily 
identifies.65 This does not mean that the movement must compromise its values or 
original framework by adopting counterproductive points of view, rather, finding 
common points of interest to discuss in a leader engagement rather than press just the 
U.S. agenda is an example of frame extension.  
Last, frame transformation is a “systematic alteration” of extant frames that do 
not resonate with the movement’s frames.66 The goal of frame transformation is to make 
an issue that was originally taken for granted into a problem that is in need of repair.67 
For instance, impoverishment may be internalized as a part of life meant to be endured, 
but through frame transformation, a person may see that the problem lies externally and 
is the fault of food-hoarding warlords. An extension of this type of transformation is a 
change of global interpretive frames, or when an individual has a thorough conversion to 
a new “universe of discourse.”68 This means that future decisions and interpretations of 
life are seen through a lens that was previously non-existent. Religious conversion (and 
not even in an extremist way) may take on this global transformation. The final 
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63 Snow, Rochford, Worden, Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes,” 470–471. 
64 Snow, Rochford, Worden, Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes,”472. 
65 Snow, Rochford, Worden, Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes,” 472. 
66 Snow, Rochford, Worden, Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes,” 474. 
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consideration is that the initial frame of a target is varied and cannot be assumed. Factors 
such as influence received from membership in other groups might not be visible to the 
IO analyst and might skew the understanding of the initial frame. Similarly, once a frame 
alignment has taken place, this new perspective cannot be taken for granted as conditions 
change and alignment may shift.69 
When the movement is violent, dangerous, or targeted by security forces, it makes 
sense to convince a participant that remaining in the movement is a negative frame that 
leads to risky behavior. Even within risky organizations such as a dark network or 
terrorist group, individuals hope for a good outcome or that their efforts are necessary to 
furthering the cause. Reframing this hope to something like despair or futility is one way 
to change the mobilizing belief behind an individual’s commitment to the movement.  
Studies on trust and social change have shown that people join networks based on 
pre-existing ties rather than on ideology alone.70 This is insightful for IO targeting 
because it would identify nodes, relationships, preexisting conditions, and environmental 
factors taken into the context of the network’s setting. These conditions and factors can 
be easily correlated with social movement frame analysis methods mentioned above. 
While the structural approach of social network analysis primarily identifies specific 
traits of nodes and ties, the second category sheds light on what makes networks emerge 
and stay cohesive over time. This distinction is not trivial. Where SNA might identify a 
particular broker of information or resources, without understanding how and for what 
motivations that individual actually controls the flow of a resource, an IO strategy may 
not be effective. 
E. NETWORK DESTABILIZATION 
With influence and frame analysis, the goal is arguably to disrupt and destabilize 
target networks. And this is the main contribution of the third broad category. It focuses 
on specific techniques to destabilize networks, especially dark networks trying to remain 
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70 Rodney Stark and William S. Bainbridge, “Networks of Faith: Interpersonal Bonds and 
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hidden, and the potential dynamic consequences of network destabilization. Applied to 
IO, deception operations are one method of disrupting dark networks.71 Successful 
counterinsurgency techniques (to include IO) have been applied to counter-gang 
operations.72 Other methods are found in Davis (1992),73 Moon (2008),74 Carley, Lee 
and Krackhardt (2002),75 and Tsevetovat and Carley (2005).76 
In sum, it is evident that the above three categories of relevant knowledge are 
appropriate to selecting IO as an option for the military commander, however it is not 
clear how to operationalize these categories when applying IO methods. It is precisely the 
intent of this thesis to fill the identified gap in the literature. In short, IO should be less 
concerned with creating “themes and messages” and more focused on mobilizing target 
audiences through inform and influence activities with the result being a frame 
realignment that favors U.S. interests and the U.S. perspective.  
F. CONCLUSION 
In summary, the purpose of studying social science and theories related to 
information operations is to develop accurate and consistent understanding of the 
motivations, structures, and properties of social interaction. The fields of social 
psychology, social influence, social movement theory, and frame alignment provides the 
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network that might be susceptible to military influence operations. They also provide 
insight into how to help disrupt target organizations. This understanding also provides 
methods for measuring success as IO strategies are applied; if a behavior change is 
perceived because of military influence activities, then perhaps the behavior change can 




Social network theories and methods identify various ways for analyzing network 
structure. Some of the more important ones included looking at networks in terms of 
critical nodes by measuring centrality scores,77 while others look at tie strength78 and 
critical relationships.79 Analyzing a network in terms of its social structure is different 
than other analytic frameworks in the behavioral and social sciences.80 Wasserman and 
Faust state that network analysis “provides a collection of descriptive procedures to 
determine how the system behaves, and statistical methods to test the appropriateness of 
the propositions. In contrast, approaches that do not include network measurements are 
unable to study and / or test such theories about structural properties.”81 The purpose of 
this thesis is to explore certain aspects of the structure of networks and describe how and 
why this is important to crafting a deceptive IO strategy.82 
In this chapter, I introduce the data, SNA methods used, and the importance of the 
metrics chosen for analysis. I then introduce the software packages and the analytical 
steps used to illustrate recommendations for deception. 
                                                 
77 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 178–192. 
78 Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology, 78 (May 1973): 
1360–1380. 
79 Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis, 20. 
80 Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis, 21. 
81 Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis, 22. 
82 I do not cover every aspect of social network analysis in this thesis. There are many good 
introductory books and websites on SNA that can be used as a primer. For example, see Robert A. 
Hanneman and Mark Riddle, Introduction to Social Network Methods, Riverside: University of California, 




This chapter uses the Noordin Top terrorist cell data set (N=237) as derived from 
the 2006 and 2009 studies by the International Crisis Group.83  These data have over 23 
explicit and implied networks available for layering and aggregation studies as well as a 
substantial set of attributes discovered in several semesters of student projects.84  I use 
the Noordin Top “operational” network as the basis for analysis, which is a multiplex, 
stacked network aggregated from the communications, logistical place, operations, 
financing, organizational, and training networks.85 Below are the definitions for what 
constitute a tie in each of the various networks: 
 “Internal communications: Defined as ties based on the relaying of 
messages between individuals and/or groups inside the network through 
some sort of medium. 
 Logistical place: Defined as key places where logistical activity—
providing materials, weapons, transportation and safehouses—occurred. 
 Operations: Includes terrorists who were directly involved with the 
Australian Embassy bombing, the Bali I Bombing, the Bali II bombing 
and/or the Marriott Hotel bombing, either at the scene (e.g., suicide 
bombers, commanders) or as a direct support to those at the scene (e.g., 
driver or lookout). It does not include ties formed through 
communications, logistics, or organizations related to the operations 
 Terrorist financing: Defined as the for-profit and not-for-profit businesses 
and foundations that employ members of the network. 
 Terrorist organizational membership: Defined as an administrative and 
functional system, whose primary common goal is the operational conduct 
of terrorist/insurgent activities, consisting of willingly affiliated claimant 
members. Factions, affiliates and offshoots are considered separate from 
their parent organization. 
 Training: Defined as participation in any specifically designated activity 
that teaches the knowledge, skills, and competencies of terrorism. It does 
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not include participation in a terrorist sponsored act or mujahedeen 
activity in places such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya or Iraq unless 
the individuals’ presence was to participate in a specifically designated 
training camp or base in one of these areas.”86  
There are many combinations of subnetworks that could be used for analysis, 
each of which give a different view of network factors and social influences. An 
“appropriate” set of actors that have the ability to disconnect a targeted node greatly 
depends on which type of network or aggregated view of sub networks are being used for 
analysis. Providing misinformation that discredits a targeted node and ultimately 
disconnects that node from a logistical network may not disconnect him from the ties he 
has within the training or the communication network. Analyzing the ease or difficulty of 
severing ties within each type of sub network provides a more complete picture as to 
which nodes must be convinced that our target is untrustworthy and should be removed 
from the organization. 
In this data set, individuals are coded as being dead, in jail, or free. I have 
removed individuals who are dead to demonstrate the current state of the network, but I 
include individuals who are currently in jail (as of the publication of IGC source 
documents). While arresting people has a disruptive effect on the network, it is likely that 
relationships remain intact and network fragmentation only truly occurs when a person is 
killed. Ties that may be dormant due to incarceration could be rekindled upon release or 
may still be valid methods of information diffusion strategies, as communication to 
others within the network may not be entirely cut off in most cases. Should an individual 
become free at some point, this analysis remains valid.  
C. ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
1. Overview of Analysis 
In this thesis, I generate two lists of individuals using Borgatti’s Key Player 1 
tool. The first list identifies those individuals who, when removed, will optimally 
fragment the terrorist network. These become the high payoff target list (HPTL), and the 
object of our deception scheme. The second list identifies nodes that will rapidly diffuse 
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any information they receive. These nodes are starting points for a dissemination plan and 
will ideally carry the misinformation about our targets. I create a third list from social 
network and intelligence analysis. This third list of individuals is actually the focus of our 
deception. These are the decision makers and personally connected nodes of those on the 
HPTL. Recall that the focus of deception is the mind of the adversarial commander, or in 
our case, those individuals who have the ability to degrade relationships and expel our 
targeted nodes. 
Examining how far and how fast our misinformation travels is the purpose of 
simulation. ORA’s Micro Simulation tool provides a graphical picture of which nodes 
have received the information and which nodes have not. When the simulation shows that 
decision maker nodes have had ample opportunity to receive and digest the 
misinformation about our targets, then the analyst knows when sufficient starting nodes 
and resources have been used. This simulated diffusion also identifies nodes that are 
candidates for further intelligence collection, thereby creating a feedback loop that can 
determine success or failure of the deception. It makes little sense to approach a source or 
install a phone tap on an individual who does not have the opportunity to receive the 
misinformation and pass it along. 
There is a complementary relationship between fragmentation analysis and 
information diffusion in terms of IO strategies. When network fragmentation is the 
operational goal and nonlethal IO methods are the means (versus a kinetic capture/kill 
option), using KPP-NEG will identify which nodes should be removed, but KPP-POS can 
be used to seed incriminating information that will hopefully cause the network to isolate 
and expel our target. Micro Simulation can validate and map the smallest target set 
required to use as seed nodes that reach essential decision makers in the shortest time 
possible.  
2. Social Network Analysis Fundamentals 
Social network analysis methods generate lists of individuals that can be 
considered as starting points for IO strategies. Analysts using SNA will sometimes use 
centrality measures to recommend individuals that are more central in the network. 
 27
Betweenness, degree, closeness, and eigenvector centrality are common measures and 
often used in the formulation of network disruption strategies.87 Betweenness centrality 
measures the frequency with which a particular node lies on the shortest path between 
other nodes. An individual with high betweenness may be considered a broker. Degree 
centrality is a measure of the number of ties a node has. Someone with high degree 
knows a lot of people. Closeness centrality measures the number of steps individuals are 
from each other. This captures the “Six-degrees of Kevin Bacon” and other small world 
phenomena. Those with a high closeness score may have faster access to information. 
Eigenvector centrality is the measure of a node that is connected to those who themselves 
are more central to the network. In this thesis, I explore fragmentation based on high 
betweenness, degree, and closeness centrality.  
Other measures of network structure may include identifying cohesive subgroups 
that highlight parts of the network with similar goals or who have a higher tendency to 
stick together.88 IO influence targeting might assume that the diffusion of a behavior-
changing idea should spread much faster in a network that has similar goals or values. 
Additionally, stacking techniques and aggregating several one-mode networks should 
also lead to insights in the ability to propagate influential messages throughout a 
network.89 Finally, inefficiencies in the network appear at the extreme edges of 
centralization (either too hierarchical or too decentralized) or at the extreme edges of 
density (either too sparse or too dense).90 IO strategies that disrupt efficiencies would 
likely see the network move towards one of these extremes. This becomes useful in 
measuring a strategy’s effectiveness. 
In crafting IO strategies, an analysis of the network’s nodes and relationships is 
required prior to creating messages, recommending a MISO dissemination plan, or 
scheduling key leader engagement meetings. One approach is to craft strategies based on 
a ranking of nodes in terms of one or more centrality score, but because highly central 
                                                 
87 Anonymous, “Deception 2.0,” 7. 
88 Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis. 
89 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 50. 
90 Sean Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 136. 
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nodes are sometimes located close to one another, it is not always optimal to target all of 
them for removal or diffusion. Consequently, I turn to Borgatti’s key player algorithms, 
which, as I discuss in more detail below, identify the optimal sets of nodes that most 
efficiently fragment the network or diffuse information.91 Borgatti argues that network 
fragmentation and information dissemination using Key Player methods is superior to 
targeting actors based on centrality scores alone.92 
Individuals who are expelled from the network or who sever association 
voluntarily may have residual ties that are difficult to map or predict, so I simplify the 
fragmentation model by assuming that the network has received sufficient information 
that the remainder of the actors in the network expel the targeted node and cut all ties. 
There are two factors that heavily influence the ability to predict a fragmentation 
of this type. The first is that the appropriate actors in the network receive enough 
information to doubt the trustworthiness of the targeted node and the second is that they 
act on that information in a manner that will effectively make the target socially “dead.” 
3. Simulating Reach of Information Diffusion 
Doubting the trustworthiness of an individual requires the judge to overcome 
existing biases that caused a degree of trust in the first place. The idea of cognitive biases 
helps humans make decisions when presented with new information. One important bias 
is that of anchoring, which is that new information is judged against a previous starting 
point or anchor.93 Adjustment is made from the anchor point rather than from “scratch.” 
Injecting misinformation about a target’s trustworthiness will almost certainly cause an 
evaluation starting from the anchoring point of what the recipient already knows or the 
reasons why he trusts the target to begin with. If the judge feels that acting on the new  
 
                                                 
91 Stephen P. Borgatti, “Identifying Sets of Key Players in a Social Network,” Computational, 
Mathematical and Organizational Theory 12 (2006): 21–34. 
92 Specifically, Borgatti identifies betweenness centrality as the measure most closely related to the 
effect of his KPP-NEG algorithm. Borgatti, “Key Players,” 23. 
93 Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective (Tel Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, Jaffe 
Center for Strategic Studies, 1988), 111. 
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information is less costly than the risk of keeping an untrusted agent in the network, then 
he will adjust his cognitive assessment (and ultimately his actions) towards removing the 
untrusted agent. 
Unfortunately, simulating a change in cognitive biases (the inner workings of the 
human brain) is extremely difficult and is beyond the scope of my study. However, 
simulating the ability for information to diffuse through a network may indicate which 
actors have had the opportunity to see incriminating information about our target and 
who may reevaluate their perception of the target. Simulating diffusion of information 
may also be useful for evaluating the effectiveness of propaganda programs, marketing, 
or mass media reach. 
Simulation is not as simple as selecting starting nodes and letting the computer 
predict the reach of the message, though. Even with the ability to factor in the resistance 
of message adoption (as ORA’s Micro Simulation tool allows), it is far more complicated 
to know which individuals will be receptive to a message and which will not. Studies 
have shown that social influences more than three steps from each other are negligible.94 
If an IO plan requires that a particular message gets delivered to a specific individual (for 
instance, the misinformation that a supplier is stealing supplies and should not be 
trusted), then it may be useful to start that rumor at a source less than three steps from the 
intended recipient. The ability to access a node within this targeted reach is something to 
consider when choosing message delivery methods and sources.  
Another consideration of simulations is the assumption that the network will 
remain constant between time slices. In actuality, networks constantly evolve over time 
as actors enter and exit the network or ties between actors change. It may also be the case 
that the content of a message may influence the network to adapt. Conversely, the 
network can change the content of the message long before it reaches the simulated 
reach, thereby altering the amount of resistance or paths of propagation originally 
simulated. Christakis and Fowler identify instability in both the network and the message 
beyond three degrees that could affect the accuracy of the simulation. Intrinsic-decay is 
                                                 
94 Christakis and Fowler, Connected, 28–30. 
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related to the message changing as it passes from point to point, akin to the childhood 
game of “telephone.” Network-instability relates to the instability of ties due to the 
changing nature of the network that makes ties beyond three steps unstable.95 
The second factor focuses on the whether those with the ability to kick out our 
target will choose to do so. Since the messages about the target node are most certainly to 
be deceptive in nature, it is also important to apply some principles of good military 
deception in crafting a misinformation plan that will end in a fragmented network.  
Finding the appropriate actors who have the authority and ability to expel a 
targeted node requires significant insight into the network itself. It is not enough to see a 
simple sociogram (i.e., network map) and run network analysis metrics in a vacuum. The 
human factors outlined in Chapter II include social movement theory, interpersonal 
relations, and other factors of social influence. The depth of knowledge required to 
incorporate social factors into a deception strategy is not trivial. Understanding the 
particular reasons that caused the network to form the way it has or operate in its own 
particular manner is critical to the IO planner in choosing how, where, and more 
importantly, why to send particular bits of information to certain individuals. 
D. ANALYTICAL SOFTWARE USED 
1. Key Player 
When developing IO methods to fragment a network, nodes identified using 
Borgatti’s key player algorithms become targets for deception operations or social 
influence plans, such that the rest of the network expels them or their effects are 
marginalized. Insertion of the deception message or affecting the social influence 
framework can be done via MISO, key leader engagement, or other means through 
general broadcast or through specific diffusion nodes as described next. When message 
diffusion is the operational requirement, Borgatti’s algorithms identify a message’s 
insertion points, which can be done by key leader engagement, MISO, or through private 
messages like e-mails and texts. 
                                                 
95 Christakis and Fowler, Connected, 28–29. 
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I operationalize the effects of fragmentation by using Borgatti’s Key Player 
algorithm and ORA to identify the optimal nodes for deception targeting and show the 
fragmentation effect when these nodes are removed. Borgatti’s software program, 
“Keyplayer 1,” seeks to identify the optimal set of actors whose removal either 
disconnects or significantly fragments the network. These algorithms are also available in 
the software package, UCINET.96 Two variations of the algorithm exist. One (KPP-NEG 
regular) uses the standard measure of fragmentation to gauge how much various sets of 
actors fragment the network when they are removed from the network. That is, a 
fragmentation score is calculated both prior to and after the removal of each of the sets, 
and the set that increases the level of fragmentation the most is considered optimal. The 
other (KPP-NEG distance weighted) is similar to the first except that rather than using the 
standard fragmentation measure, it uses a distance-weighted measure that identifies the 
optimal set of actors whose removal lengthens the average distance (in terms of path 
length) between all pairs of actors in the network.97  
To identify nodes for targeting I run both the regular and distance-weighted KPP-
NEG algorithms in order to identify the key players for sets of size one through twenty. I 
then plot the regular and distance weighted fragmentation score against the size of each 
set in order to determine when adding additional nodes to the target list becomes less 
efficient. I also create a sociograms before and after each subsequent node removal to 
visualize the fragmentation effect. 
Borgatti, recognizing that the removal of actors may not always be the best or 
desired strategy, developed an additional algorithm designed to find the optimal set of 
actors that can pass along information that reaches the highest number of other actors. 
Here again, he developed two variations on this diffusion algorithm. One (KPP-POS 
regular) simply counts the proportion of distinct actors reached by the set of key actors; 
                                                 
96 For an explanation of the steps to identify key players in UCINET, see Everton, Disrupting Dark 
Networks, 271–277. 
97 Borgatti, “Key Player,” 23. 
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the other (KPP-POS distance weighted) weights this calculation by the path distance 
between the set of key actors and all other actors in the network.98 
2. Micro Simulation 
To operationalize the effects of information diffusion, I use both the regular and 
distance-weighted KPP-POS measures to identify optimal nodes for information 
diffusion and ORA’s Micro Simulation tool to show the extent of this diffusion.99 From 
“Key Player 1,” I create lists of one through twenty nodes for each measure.100 Plotting 
both the regular and distance-weighted reach scores against the number of insertion nodes 
creates a graph indicating when adding additional nodes becomes less efficient.  
I then run Micro Simulation in “Information Diffusion” mode, set at 0.0, 0.5, and 
0.9 resistance factors, using the lists of one, five, and ten key players. These resistance 
factors model low, medium, and very high reluctance to adopt the message and pass it to 
connected nodes. Higher resistance replicates either a poorly resonating message framed 
inappropriately for that particular network or other social factors that make messages less 
likely to be acceptable or passed along. One, five, and ten key players are chosen for 
illustrative purposes only. I then measure the time steps required until maximum 
information diffusion and create sociograms that visually depict what portions of the 
network are likely to be affected by the misinformation plan. 
Micro Simulation has several diffusion modes, but “Information Diffusion” best 
fits the aims of this research. This mode looks at every node that has a resource (a piece 
of information in our case) and iteratively passes the resource to all outgoing nodes based 
on link weight. If a transmission can beat the resistance factor, the resource is passed. The 
transmissions continue for a specified number of time periods, using the following rules:  
1. An agent can give away information it has access to. 
2. An agent retains information even after giving it away. 
                                                 
98 Borgatti, “Key Players,” 27.  
99 I use ORA version 2.3.6, build date of September 2011. 
100 I use KeyPlayer version 1.45. 
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3. An agent never loses information it gains. 
4. An agent never stops giving away information.101 
I simplify the diffusion model by assuming that the message is perfectly 
transmitted according to the above rules, and that neither the message nor the network 
changes between time periods. These time periods are arbitrary and can reflect minutes or 
days. In actuality, the information may not diffuse uniformly because the communication 
patterns of individual agents do not necessarily line up with our chosen time periods.  
As a final point, simulation has the added benefit of identifying nodes of interest 
that can potentially be used to provide feedback. It is a much more useful to have 
intelligence feedback about the effectiveness of diffusion already in place before 
delivering a message. If simulations show that certain parts of the network consistently 
are involved in spreading the message, than this is an area to assign intelligence resources 
to confirm or deny successful diffusion. Intelligence assets can also assist in identifying if 
the message is being altered as it propagates or if the network is shifting to adapt to the 
content of the message. This new information may be fed into simulations again to 
identify possible outcomes or prepare for contingencies. 
E. METRICS OF INTEREST 
1. Fragmentation 
The definition and meaning of both fragmentation and diffusion are important 
here. There are several ways to measure fragmentation. As Borgatti put it, “Perhaps the 
most obvious measure of network fragmentation is a count of the number of components. 
If the count is 1, there is no fragmentation. The maximum fragmentation occurs when 
every node is an isolate, creating as many components as nodes.”102 Maximal 
fragmentation in an insurgent network is not feasible, as this requires either eliminating 
every connection between individuals or removing every individual from the network. 
Removing every tie in the network is impossible, as some of our connections are blood 
                                                 
101 ORA help file, “Micro Simulation.” 
102 Borgatti, “Key Player,” 26. 
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ties or other states of being rather than social or emotional connections. Removing every 
individual from the network through law enforcement or counter-insurgency operations is 
possible, but again, not feasible because of the amount of time and resources required as 
well as limitations in intelligence available on each node. 
The normal fragmentation score in Borgatti’s algorithm attempts to find solution 
sets that maximize the number of components created by removal of the set. The 
distance-weighted algorithm accounts for the reciprocal distance between nodes and 
weights a solution set based on transmission or transportation length in addition to trying 
to maximize the number of components created.103 This is referred to as the non-
cohesion measure in the “Key Player 1” software. 
In this thesis, I compute distance-weighted fragmentation in addition to normal 
fragmentation, but generally display graphs based on the normal measure, as I can 
compare this measure against simple fragmentation based on node sets derived from 
centrality scores. I examine this comparison in Chapter IV. 
2. Diffusion 
According to Borgatti, diffusion is based on “the connection or cohesion that 
members of one set of nodes (the kp set) have with members of anther (the remainder of 
the network). To solve the problem, we need a direct measure of the amount of 
connection between a set and the rest of the graph.”104 The normal measure of diffusion 
(KPP-POS normal) uses a group degree centrality measure to identify the nodes of a 
given set size that maximizes the reach of the set.105 This is measured in terms of the 
percent of the network reached. 
The distance weighted diffusion score weights the solution set by the distance 
between linked nodes. This measure is referred to as the reciprocal distance index in the 
Key Player 1 software. 
                                                 
103 Borgatti, “Key Player,” 27. 
104 Borgatti, “Key Player,” 28. 
105 Borgatti, “Key Player,” 29. 
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Again, I calculate both normal and distance weighted measures, but I report the 
normal diffusion score to examine the percentage of the network reached by a set of 
nodes. Although simpler, this measure makes more intuitive sense than a reciprocal 
distance index and better explains the goal of operationalizing diffusion. 
F. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have identified the data and methods used in analyzing a terrorist 
network, looking for key nodes that would provide the most powerful fragmentation and 
information diffusion effects. Simulations help predict the extent of these effects. This 
analysis sets the stage for a discussion of the results and their implication for deception.  
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I identify the two sets of nodes generated through Keyplayer 1 and 
report fragmentation and diffusion scores. Next, I discuss fragmentation results and how 
centrality measures and Key Player fragmentation scores relate. Graphing the location of 
targeted nodes in the network and then graphing the structure of the network after 
removing these nodes provides a visual product that is useful in seeing how much the 
network would be affected by this fragmentation strategy. Next, I discuss diffusion 
results based on simulations and map the information as it flows through the network. I 
also show that sometimes the same amount of the network can be reached with a smaller 
number of starting nodes, thereby simplifying the targeting process somewhat.  
B. KEY PLAYER ANALYSIS  
The Key Player tool generates lists of nodes that optimize the extent of 
fragmentation or reach of diffusion, yet it does not prioritize the individuals within the 
list. Prioritization must be done elsewhere in the targeting process; however, lists made 
from centrality measures are prioritized based on the value of the respective centrality 
score. It is possible to assist prioritization of key player lists by using centrality scores, 
intelligence reports, and the commander’s instinct to rank order a target set. It is 
extremely important to note that the Key Player list will change depending on the size of 
the list required. In other words, an individual who appears on a list of five may not be on 
the list of four targets or six targets.106 It is also likely that Key Player will generate 
multiple solutions for certain list sizes. This means that there is more than one set of 
nodes for each list size that will provide the same fragmentation score. The lists of 
individuals will be presented in subsequent sections for both fragmentation and diffusion 
analysis. 
                                                 
106 Borgatti calls this the “ensemble issue,” which argues that certain sets of nodes produce a greater 
effect on the network than the sum of individual nodes would. See Borgatti, “Key Player,” 24–25. 
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Having multiple sets of solutions is both a blessing and a curse to the targeting 
process. If further analysis reveals that a portion of one solution set is not readily 
accessible or if the IO strategy may not be successful, then switching to another solution 
set is an option. Unfortunately, it makes it difficult to direct intelligence assets onto a 
constantly changing list. Even though there are often overlaps of nodes between solution 
sets, care must be taken to ensure that the entire set is considered at the same time in 
order to expect a specific fragmentation result. Mixing and matching nodes into a custom 
solution may not be any more effective than randomly choosing targets, thereby defeating 
the whole purpose of network analysis. 
I also generate lists of individuals from standard centrality measures 
(betweenness, closeness, and total degree). This allows for the comparison of 
fragmentation and diffusion effects between Key Player and centrality lists. It also 
indicates which individuals are likely the organization leaders and who should be the 
actual targets of our deception. Table 1 lists the top ten individuals based on their 
respective centrality scores, with higher scores indicating higher centrality. 
 
Rank Betweenness Value Closeness Value Total Degree Value 
1 Gun-Gun 0.090 Ubeid 0.027 Ubeid 0.293 
2 Ahmad Rofiq Ridho 0.072 Chandra 0.027 Gun-Gun 0.278 
3 Ubeid 0.062 Ahmad Rofiq Ridho 0.027 Chandra 0.273 
4 Hambali 0.049 Hari Kuncoro 0.027 Hari Kuncoro 0.258 
5 Chandra 0.045 Gun-Gun 0.026 Umar Patek 0.247 
6 Abdul Aziz 0.044 Umar Patek 0.026 Ahmad Rofiq Ridho 0.232 
7 Abdullah Sunata 0.038 Ali Imron 0.026 Ali Imron 0.217 
8 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 0.038 Umar2 0.026 Hambali 0.217 
9 Usman bin Sef 0.035 Cholily 0.026 Umar2 0.217 
10 Subur Sugiarto 0.035 Umar1 (Umar Burhanuddin) 0.026 
Umar1 (Umar 
Burhanuddin) 0.202 
Table 1.   Fragmentation list based on centrality measures 
Table 2 is a summary of the Key Player analysis run against the Noordin Top 
network with dead individuals removed (n=199). As a reminder, KPP-NEG identifies the 
optimal set of nodes for fragmenting a network, and KPP-POS identifies the optimal set 
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of nodes for diffusing information through the network. The distance-weighted measures 
take into consideration path distances between nodes as described in Chapter III. Lists of 
up to 20 individuals are considered in the analysis. 
 
# Nodes Used 















Base 0.330   
1 0.362 0.699 70.9% 53.8% 
2 0.386 0.706 78.4% 62.1% 
3 0.402 0.717 81.9% 67.5% 
4 0.417 0.759 82.9% 71.8% 
5 0.433 0.766 83.4% 74.3% 
6 0.504 0.771 83.9% 76.5% 
7 0.518 0.792 84.4% 78.1% 
8 0.532 0.799 84.9% 79.1% 
9 0.539 0.804 85.4% 80.3% 
10 0.546 0.808 85.9% 81.2% 
11 0.552 0.813 85.9% 81.7% 
12 0.559 0.820 86.9% 82.4% 
13 0.566 0.837 87.4% 82.7% 
14 0.572 0.849 87.4% 83.2% 
15 0.579 0.847 87.9% 83.9% 
16 0.598 0.851 88.4% 84.4% 
17 0.605 0.861 89.4% 84.9% 
18 0.598 0.857 89.9% 85.2% 
19 0.616 0.867 89.9% 85.7% 
20 0.611 0.872 90.5% 86.2% 
Table 2.   Key Player analysis summary measures for Noordin Top network with dead 
individuals removed (n=199) 
C. FRAGMENTATION ANALYSIS 
I begin fragmentation analysis with a chart that compares the extent of network 
fragmentation of up to 20 nodes based on the KPP-NEG fragmentation score and 
centrality measures of betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, and total degree 




Figure 1.  Graph of network fragmentation based on centrality measures and the  
Key Player fragmentation score. 
Finally, Figure 2 shows sociograms (i.e., network maps) of the Noordin Top 
network before any fragmentation occurs and after removing the 10 nodes identified with 
Key Player. Although the number of isolated nodes has not substantially increased, there 
are now three significant components and a smaller three-person component that have 
been split away from each other.  
 
  
Figure 2.  Left: Top 10 recommended deception targets identified by KPP-NEG normal, 





























D. DIFFUSION ANALYSIS 
For diffusion analysis, I use KPP-POS (regular) to identify key player sets of size 
one, five, and ten for illustrative purposes (see Tables 3, 4, and 5). This information 
identifies insertion points for ORA’s Micro Simulation tool to model diffusion of a 
message and are insertion points for our deception plan. As noted in Chapter III, I run 
Micro Simulation set at 0.0, 0.5, and 0.9 resistance factors with the “Information 
Diffusion” option using all three lists to simulate difficulty of accepting the message and 
likelihood of passing it on.  
 
Recommended diffusion target list (alphabetized) 
(KPP-POS [fixed size], 1 nodes, percent network reached = 70.9%) 
Node ID Name Current Status Technical Skills 
32 Ahmad Rofiq Ridho Jail Bomb Maker, Courier 
Table 3.   Recommended starting points for a diffusion plan (1 node) 
 
Recommended diffusion target list (alphabetized) 
(KPP-POS [fixed size], 5 nodes, percent network reached = 83.4%) 
Node ID Name Current Status Technical Skills 
24 Agus Ahmad Jail Facilitator 
32 Ahmad Rofiq Ridho Jail Bomb Maker, Courier 
49 Aris Susanto Jail Courier 
54 Ayman al-Zawahri107 Alive Strategist, Leader 
183 Umar (Yemeni) Alive Bomber/Fighter 






                                                 
107 Note: Ayman al-Zawahri is the current spokesman/de-facto leader for al-Qa’ida. His inclusion in 
Noordin Top’s network is incidental as he is obviously not a member directly involved with planning and 
coordinating operations with this network. This is a function of how Key Player Analysis looks for the 
ability to maximally reach anyone within the network who is not an isolated node. Al-Zawahri resides in a 
disconnected dyad, or pair of nodes, and is therefore included because of the key player algorithm design. 
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Recommended diffusion target list (alphabetized) 
(KPP-POS [fixed size], 5 nodes, percent network reached = 83.4%) 
Node ID Name Current Status Technical Skills 
24 Agus Ahmad Jail Facilitator 
32 Ahmad Rofiq Ridho Jail Bomb Maker, Courier 
49 Aris Susanto Jail Courier 
54 Ayman al-Zawahri Alive Strategist, Leader 
82 Hasan (Saudi) Alive Bomber/Fighter 
83 Helmi Hanafi Alive Facilitator 
108 Jusuf Kalla Alive  
118 Maslamah Alive Bomber/Fighter 
142 Muhsin (Yemeni) Alive  
148 Mustaqim4 (Ubeid’s brother-in-law) Alive  
Table 5.   Recommended starting points for a diffusion plan (10 nodes) 
I also graph the diffusion over five theoretical time periods, assuming that both 
the network and the message will not change between time periods and that each node 
communicates uniformly. Figure 3 shows the reach of diffusion of one, five, and ten 
nodes over time at 50% resistance, while Figure 4 shows the same information at 90% 
resistance. At 50% resistance, it is interesting to note that both five and ten node sets 
provide similar message reach over time (82.4% and 84.9%, respectively) and a seed 
node of one reaches 77.4% of the network in the same time. When resistance to the 
message increases to 90%, the reach of diffusion drops off significantly. Ten seed nodes 
still reach the same 84.9% of the network, but one and five nodes only reach 47.2% and 
65.3% of the network, respectively. 
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Figure 3.  Percent of network reached over time using 1, 5, and 10 key player “seed” 
nodes at 50% resistance. 
 
Figure 4.  Percent of network reached over time using 1, 5, and 10 key player  
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Reach of Diffusion
90% Resistance
1 seed 5 seeds 10 seeds
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The structure of the network is visible in the sociograms depicted in Table 7. 
There is a very closely connected central core with two relatively independent clusters 
slightly separated from the core. These network maps show nodes who have received the 
message in green (sometimes blue because of ORA’s internal settings), whereas nodes 
that have not yet received the message remain red. 
When a starting node is within the largest connected cluster (not an isolate) the 
maximum reach is 81.9% (163 out of 199 nodes). In order to reach 100% of the network, 
it would require injecting the message to each of the 36 isolated nodes separately. For 
brevity, I only show sociograms of information diffusion based on KPP-POS run in 
normal mode at 50% resistance, but the method is the same for lists generated using the 
distance-weighted algorithm as well as for graphing other resistance levels. 
 
 Column 1 – misinfo. injected 
via 1 node 
KPP-POS, fixed, 50% resistance, 
1 node 
Column 2 – misinfo. injected 
via 5 nodes 
KPP-POS, fixed, 50% resistance, 
5 nodes
Column 3 – misinfo. injected  
via 10 nodes 
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In this chapter, I analyzed the results from Key Player 1 and use an example list to 
show the effects of fragmentation compared to the fragmentation derived from standard 
centrality measures. I also explored a diffusion list generated by Key Player 1 and 
simulate how a message spreads through the network. Resistance to spreading and the 
number of starting nodes shows the ease or difficult in saturating the network with the 
message over time. The more nodes, the more time, or the more accepting a message is to 
the network, the higher the reach will eventually be. 
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V. DISCUSSION 
A. FRAGMENTATION DISCUSSION 
If we created a HPTL based on centrality measures alone (Table 1), we could 
conclude that Gun-Gun, Ahmad Rofiq Ridho, Chandra, or Ubeid would be ideal 
individuals for removal via lethal targeting or nonlethal IO. However, only Gun-Gun and 
Ahmad Rofiq Ridho appear on the top-ten list generated by the Key Player tool for 
optimal network fragmentation. Ubeid does not come up on the list until the target set is 
expanded to 12 or more and Chandra is not identified as a key node for optimal 
fragmentation at all. Targeting Ubeid or Chandra while expecting the network to 
fragment is probably a waste of resources. Therefore, a more appropriate HPTL based on 
Key Player analysis is found in Table 7. These are the individuals we want to remove 
from the network, and are not necessarily the targets for the deception itself. 
 
Recommended fragmentation target list (alphabetized) 
(KPP-NEG [normal], 10 nodes, network fragmentation = 0.546) 
Node ID Name Current Status Technical Skills 
3 Abdul Malik Alive Recruiter, Facilitator 
12 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Jail Propagandist, Religious Leader 
32 Ahmad Rofiq Ridho Jail Bomb Maker, Courier 
39 Amir Ibrahim Jail Resource Provider 
57 Cholily Jail Courier, Bomb Maker 
75 Gun-Gun Alive Courier 
78 Hambali Jail Leader, Bomber/Fighter 
99 Iwan Dharmawan Jail Local Leader, Recruiter 
141 Muhammed Jibril Jail Resource Provider 
190 Usman bin Sef Alive Resource Provider 
Table 7.   Top ten list of key players recommended for removal via a deception 
strategy 
I initially list a 10-node set based on KPP-NEG to illustrate a recommended target 
list. After 10 nodes, the rate of fragmentation increases faster when removing nodes 
based on high betweenness centrality, but the fragmentation score for KPP-NEG remains 
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higher until a set of 16 or more nodes are removed from the network. At this point, nodes 
prioritized on betweenness centrality appear to fragment the network more. Removing 
nodes high in closeness centrality or degree centrality have very little effect on the 
fragmentation of the network. A 10-node set shows a greater amount of disassociated 
clusters or components on the network map than would be visible with a more 
manageable two or three node set. 
Developing a deception program that simultaneously discredits this number of 
people is extremely taxing on available resources. It is more reasonable to create a fully 
planned and resourced deception strategy aimed at causing the network to reject one or 
two individuals at a time; however, the removal of just one node in the Noordin Top 
network would have minimal effect (roughly 36%, or a 3% increase over the baseline). 
Jumping to 50% fragmentation requires the removal of just six nodes, which still might 
be a stretch in a resource-constrained environment, but it is much more efficient than 10 
or 20 nodes. Balancing the effect the commander wants with the ability to resource an 
operation to get to that level is a major planning consideration. A more moderate six-
node list is found in Table 8. 
 
Recommended fragmentation target list (alphabetized) 
(KPP-NEG [normal], 6 nodes, network fragmentation = 0.504) 
Node ID Name Current Status Technical Skills 
1 Abdul Aziz Jail Propagandist 
3 Abu Malik Alive Recruiter, Facilitator 
7 Abdullah Sunata Jail Religious Leader 
39 Amir Ibrahim Jail Resource Provider 
120 Mira Augustina’s Father Alive  
172 Subur Sugiarto Jail Courier 
Table 8.   Top six list of key players recommended for removal via a deception 
strategy 
Notice that the list of ten and the list of six have significantly different 
individuals. Recall that the Key Player algorithm creates “sets” of nodes that optimally 
fragment the network. In order to achieve a fragmentation of 50%, all six nodes would 
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need to be removed nearly simultaneously. Similarly, in order to achieve a fragmentation 
of 54.6%, all ten nodes from Table 7 would need to be simultaneously removed. Key 
Player analysis does not generate a prioritized list, so the analyst cannot simply add or 
subtract individuals and expect the same amount of fragmentation predicted by Key 
Player. 
It is very reasonable to assume that the nodes whose removal would optimally 
fragment the network via a deception strategy may not actually be feasible targets. Two 
alternatives exist: the first is to recommend a lethal strategy that attempts to capture or 
kill key nodes in order to achieve optimal fragmentation;108 the second is to accept a less 
optimal target set that is more accessible to our targeting efforts. Of course, the latter 
would reduce the fragmentation effects, but may be a feasible recommendation within a 
comprehensive plan with more than just IO methods. Alternately, a target who would be 
an optimal node for a lethal kill/capture operation but is not accessible that way (due to 
boundary restrictions, rules of engagement, political sensitivity, or lack of geolocation 
data) may be a perfect candidate for a deception plan.  
B. DIFFUSION DISCUSSION 
In the analysis, I simulated diffusion with resistances of 0%, 50%, and 90% to 
replicate increasing difficulty in passing a message along. Comparing the amount of 
diffusion at different resistance levels and with different numbers of starting points can 
give the IO planner insight into how to prioritize resources. If sufficient message 
saturation were reached with fewer nodes, this would reduce the number key leader 
engagements or MISO products (television commercials, bulletin boards, text messages, 
etc.) required. However, if the network is assessed to be highly resistant to any external 
messages, more starting nodes may be required. 
In Figure 3, I displayed a graph showing the percentage of the network reached 
with one, five, and ten starting nodes with a resistance factor of 50%. As noted, the 
percentage of the network reached with one and five nodes is very similar (roughly 82–
84%). This means that in theory, we would need to inject misinformation through a single 
                                                 
108 Roberts and Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 4. 
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source in order to cause the message to reach nearly everyone in the central core. The 
likely candidate for this would be Ahmad Rofiq Ridho, who is currently in jail. 
Unfortunately, using a single source for any type of information plan is often a bad idea 
as it figuratively puts all the eggs in one basket. A minimal amount of redundancy would 
help overcome the flaws inherent in moving from a simulation to a real world operation. 
This redundancy should come from adding additional nodes. For example, using 
the list of five starting nodes (see Table 4) would provide additional input to the network, 
even though diffusion would not be any more rapid. One caveat would be to eliminate 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current spokesman for al-Qa’ida. His inclusion in Noordin Top’s 
network is incidental as he is obviously not a member directly involved with planning 
and coordinating operations with this network. This is a function of how Key Player 
algorithms look for the ability to maximally reach anyone within the network who is not 
an isolated node. Al-Zawahri resides in a disconnected dyad, or pair of nodes, and is 
therefore included because of the key player algorithm design. Additionally, Umar 
(Yemeni) is an isolated node and cannot pass information to others (again, a function of 
Key Player algorithms choosing entire “sets”). The recommended insertion nodes are 
therefore Ahmad Rofiq Ridho, Agus Ahmad, and Aris Susanto. 
Table 9 displays the fragmentation targets and the count of direct connections that 
must be reached in order meet the goal of getting the misinformation message to 
everyone associated with the target. Each time period, the message diffuses deeper into 
the network, and even with a 50% resistance factor, the entire set of direct connections is 
reached by time 5, and in some cases, as early as time 3. Of course, those targets with 







Recommended fragmentation target list (alphabetized) 




Connections Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 Time 5 
1 Abdul Aziz 16 15 12 10 5 0 
3 Abdul Malik 18 17 11 1 0 0 
7 Abdullah Sunata 35 34 22 3 1 0 
39 Amir Ibrahim 10 9 4 0 0 0 
120 Mira Augustina’s Father 17 16 9 1 1 0 
172 Subur Sugiarto 13 12 10 6 0 0 
Table 9.   List of fragmentation targets and the number of direct connections. Each 
time period lists the number of direct connections who have NOT yet 
received the information. 
C. FEEDBACK AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 
Key Player analysis and Micro Simulation identify nodes that should be 
recommended for further research by the IO planner and the intelligence staff. More 
importantly, Key Player analysis and Micro Simulation identify parts of the network that 
would be better places to setup and deploy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
resources before any disruption operation takes place. Early establishment of ISR helps 
capture indicators that the operation is actually happening in the manner we had intended. 
These indicators, or measures of effectiveness, are essential in order to show success or 
failure to the military commander. If these indicators are not present, then the IO planners 
can recommend changes to ISR allocation or changes to the strategy. 
The majority of individuals in the diffusion list (Tables 3, 4, and 5) are alive and 
not in jail, which might reduce the accessibility for using them as a starting point for 
message diffusion. On the other hand, the ones in jail might be approached by 
intelligence personnel and be recruited or convinced to pass along our message. Ahmad 
Rofiq Ridho appears on the one-, five-, and ten-person diffusion lists. Aris Susanto and 
Agus Ahmad, both of whom are in jail, appear on both the five and ten node lists. These 
individuals would be priority recommendations for intelligence recruitment.  
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Ridho also has high closeness, degree, and betweenness centrality scores, 
meaning he has many connections and brokers resources in the network. Answering 
whether these connections are extant would be useful in determining if he could in fact 
disseminate a message as rapidly as the simulation indicates. Monitoring his prison visits 
and patterns of communication could provide insight into Ridho’s influence. 
D. LIMITATIONS TO SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
1. Boundary Accuracy 
Predicting fragmentation and information diffusion is heavily dependent upon the 
boundaries of the network used. The choice to include a relationship is highly subjective. 
Does kinship include cousins? How about spouses of cousins? Can we suppose that two 
individuals who worked at an organization at the same time as having a relationship, or 
can we assume they even know each other? It is essential that the IO planner work with 
intelligence analysts to create a codebook that defines ties and relationships and whether 
an actor should be included or excluded. This document allows for consistent choices in 
creating the boundary around a network. 
I chose one slice of the possible combinations of networks within Noordin Top’s 
organization. Using a similar data set, Everton and Cunningham identify at least 20 
possible configurations that could vary the outcome of Key Player and diffusion 
analysis.109 It might be useful to do Key Player analysis on several configurations of the 
network (e.g., kinship network, trust network, operational ties, etc.) and find those 
individuals who continually surface as key players. This way, the analyst examines 
different aspects of social influence and can make an even more informed 
recommendation for targeting through deception. 
2. Alternatives to Nodal Analysis 
Nodal analysis looks at each entity as a single actor in the network, but there are 
other ways of looking at networks. Kempe et. al. argue that selecting individual nodes 
                                                 
109 Sean Everton, “Social Network Change Detection,” lecture, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School (October 18, 2012). See also Everton and Cunningham, “Detecting Significant Changes,” 6–8. 
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may not be the most effective way of influencing the network (especially large ones) for 
a particular product or innovation to “go viral.” Their research suggests that random 
target selection above a certain threshold outperforms selective targeting using centrality 
measures.110 For military purposes, this product or innovation could be a desired 
behavior or attitude change favorable to U.S. interests. Viral adoption research might be 
useful for large audience mobilization desired by MISO, but might not be important for 
small or dark networks. 
Targeting strategies that focus on the removal of single nodes (or small sets of 
nodes), especially those high in centrality measures are generally not effective, as the 
network has the ability to rapidly recover and heal from these surgical removals. 
Tsvetovat and Carley argue that nodes with structural equivalence to the targeted nodes 
are able to rebalance the flow of resources until the network stabilizes.111 
Instead of looking at individuals in the network, one alternative is to strategize 
disruption plans around the group or the organization. Group targeting is centered on 
subsets of the network and organization targeting looks at more than a single network.112 
With the Noordin Top data set, social network analysis might collapse individuals into 
groups with similar attributes, such as bomb makers, logisticians and facilitators, and 
religious leaders, or those who live in the same geographic region. Applying 
fragmentation methodologies would indicate which group’s removal would disrupt the 
network the most.  
                                                 
110 David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, and Eva Tardos, “Maximizing the Spread of Influence Through a 
Social Network,” SIGKDD (2003): 7. 
111 Tsvetovat and Carley, “Structural Knowledge.” For more on the effects of structural equivalence 
and position within the network, see Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, Chapter 9. 
112 Roberts and Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 4. 
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The methods I describe in this thesis are just one way to assist in the IO targeting 
process. They are intended to augment, not replace, thorough intelligence preparation and 
good staff work. SNA is useful in identifying nodes that assist the diffusion of a message. 
It is also useful in finding vulnerabilities of a covert network, such as where too many 
tasks or decision-making responsibilities lie with one person, or whether a broker of 
resources can be replaced with an equivalent actor. 
A. FUTURE RESEARCH 
In addition to network fragmentation and the idea of message diffusion, there are 
other options for the IO strategist to consider that would benefit from social network 
analysis techniques. Roberts and Everton identify several non-kinetic options including 
capacity building, institution-building, and rehabilitation that can be studied on the 
individual, group, or organization levels.113  
The ORA software program contains four diffusion simulation methods, of which 
I explored one, the information diffusion algorithm. Although the procedures are 
essentially “black box” with very little documentation about how they actually run, it 
would be interesting to test message propagation against one or more of these models. 
Perhaps a modification of the disease propagation or the diffusion of innovations models 
might better explain how humans receive, process, and pass along information. The 
resistance factor might vary depending on network location, time, or environmental 
factors that are currently not visible to the model. 
ORA also contains a more complicated predictive simulation called Near Term 
Analysis, or Construct. This simulation investigates the dynamics of network behavior 
using complex socio-cultural variables. It uses sub-networks of actors, knowledge, tasks,  
 
 
                                                 
113 Roberts and Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 5–7. 
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and resources to model behavior. Construct requires more input in terms of network 
coding, but may be able to better predict social and cultural influences in network 
behavior.114 
Finally, there is a considerable amount of data in social networking applications 
that can better inform network structure and the social influences. Research in social 
media and social networking applications as a means for information diffusion would be 
an interesting use of SNA in IO targeting. There are indications that insurgents and 
terrorists using social media platforms both have the ability to influence others and are 
influenced themselves by the tools they use, thereby affecting their decisions.115 
Considering these social influence factors in the IO strategy is a wise choice. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IO PLANNERS AND MILITARY 
COMMANDERS 
This thesis takes a narrow slice of possible ways to disrupt an adversarial 
network. Because deception is only one method of conducting an information operation, 
which itself is only one facet of nonlethal targeting, it would be useful to military 
organizations to apply social network analysis in all intelligence, targeting, and planning 
teams. The benefits of fragmentation analysis using Key Player methods are obvious to 
the lethal targeting team, but what about Civil Affairs or reconciliation planners? Are 
there aspects of SNA that would provide civil capacity planners the ability to reach out to 
neutral and friendly audiences that would more efficiently utilize their precious funds? 
The integration of IO and intelligence is of paramount importance in a deception 
plan as well as other methods of nonlethal strategies. Intelligence involvement in 
understanding both the human/social terrain as well as the information environment our 
                                                 
114 For an introduction to Construct see Brian R. Hirshman, Kathleen M. Carley, and Michael J. 
Kowalchuck, “Specifying Agents in Construct,” Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon University (July 25, 2007) 
and Brian R. Hirshman, Kathleen M. Carley, and Michael J. Kowalchuck, “Loading Networks in 
Construct,” Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon University (July 26, 2007). Additionally, a study of network 
destabilization techniques can be found in Il-Chul Moon and Kathleen M. Carley, “Locating Optimal 
Destabilization Strategies,” in 12th ICCRTS, Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon University (2007). These can be 
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115 M. Craig Geron, “IO in an Unpredictable World,” IO Sphere (Winter 2007), 4. 
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targets operate in must occur well before any planning takes place.116 Intelligence 
analysts must be trained to build databases of information that consider many different 
types and strengths of relationships. It is potentially more important to understand why a 
relationship exists between two people or groups than the mere fact that it does exist. 
Manipulating the social bond between two people requires understanding many of the 
social and cognitive factors described in Chapter II. 
Resourcing the IO planning team with dedicated intelligence analysts who are 
trained in SNA methods allows for the rapid creation and analysis of different views of 
an adversarial network. These analysts would be able to assist with the background work 
needed to understand the human terrain as well as make appropriate recommendations for 
intelligence collection that best serve the execution and feedback of IO plans. 
In summary, this thesis has explored how a deception plan against a terrorist 
network can be informed and prepared using social network analysis. First, I identified 
key nodes for removal that increase the amount of network fragmentation. Next, I 
identified nodes that could be used to insert misinformation and simulate how quickly it 
would theoretically spread through the network. Third, I looked for individuals connected 
to the fragmentation targets and checked to see they had the opportunity to receive the 
misinformation. Fourth, I recommended nodes that require intelligence collection in order 
to provide feedback about the success of message dissemination and the deception effort. 
Finally, I outlined some of the drawbacks to using SNA in IO planning and offered 
several recommendations for the use of SNA and the integration of intelligence and IO. 
                                                 
116 Cox, “Information Operations,” 17–24. 
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